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BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA. By Edward A.
Purcell, Jr.' Yale University Press. 2000. Pp. 417. $40.00.
Tony A. Freyer
The federal judiciary's role in American constitutional governance is a useful reference point at the new millennium. Early
in the nation's life Alexis de Tocqueville commented that the interdependency between unelected federal judges and an aggressively active democracy reflected the distinctiveness of American institutions. 3 During the twentieth century, the impact of the
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary on American society
and government seemed to grow apace. Following the Second
World War, the historic promotion of civil rights and liberties
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren and the Supreme Court highlighted the irony that attaining greater democratic inclusiveness depended on a nonelected judiciary. Since
the 1970s growing numbers of commentators questioned the
propriety of this constitutional interdependency, while others de-

1. Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School.
2. University Research Professor of History and Law, The University of Alabama.
A.B., San Diego State University, 1970; A.M. 1972, PhD, 1975, Indiana University. The
author accepted the invitation to review this book on the understanding that he would
acknowledge that he contributed a statement the publisher used for promotional purposes. Also the author wishes to thank for support, Dean Kenneth C. Randall, The University of Alabama Law School Foundation, and the Edward Brett Randolph Fund.
3. De Tocqueville's assessment may be summarized as follows: In antebellum
America the states rather than the federal government exercised "real power." Nevertheless, Americans accepted that "it was almost impossible that the execution of a new
law should not injure some private interest." The Constitution's "makers ... relied on
that private interest to attack the legislative measure of which the Union might have
complained[,)" and "[i)t is to that interest that they offer protection." Thus, while federal
justice and state sovereignty were at odds, the federal judiciary "attacks only indirectly ... strik[ing) at the consequences of the law, not at its principle; it does not abolish
but enervates it." The federal courts "intervene[ d) in public affairs only by chance, but
that chance recur[ red] daily." Thus "Federal judges almost always alone decide those
questions that touch the government of the country most closely." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 99, 143, 148, 149, 276 n.7. (J.P. Mayer, ed., George Lawrence trans., Doubleday, 1969).
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fended it as an appropriate expression of institutional checks and
balances. 4
Through the changing image of the prominent Progressive
figure, Louis D. Brandeis and his landmark opinion in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938), Edward A. Purcell's new book locates
this institutional transformation within the sweep of twentiethcentury American social and political conflict. Lawyers recall
Erie as a "great case" and "jurisprudential landmark" which
nonetheless remains controversial because it establishes a constitutionally contentious procedural boundary between state and
federal court jurisdiction. Most historians, by contrast, find the
decision of interest because it is associated with legalistic maneuvering which has been especially favorable to corporate litigants, including the practice known as forum shopping by which
corporate defendants escaped less friendly state courts by removing cases to federal courts. 5
An historian who wrote a prize-winning study of democratic
theory in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America,
Purcell has been for some years a practicing lawyer and law professor. Thus, in the language of history and law Purcell is fluently bilingual. He has drawn together the two disciplines in a
growing body of scholarship, including a thoughtful and extensive social and legal history of federal diversity jurisdiction in industrial America, 1870-1958. 6 His new book gives historians a
deeper understanding of the federal judiciary-and the legal
profession, which are its chief agents-as central institutional
channels for ordering social conflict within American constitutional governance and the corporate market economy. It provides members of the legal profession insight into the procedural
and constitutional issues associated with the origins, decision,
and subsequent evolution of one of the most important precedents in American law.
Section I of this review considers the origins of what Purcell
calls the Progressive constitution. The second section examines

4. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and The Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (Macmillan, 1960); Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural Injunction, 7
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 335 (1984).
5. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Purcell engages the huge
literature about the Erie case, so that law teachers, practicing lawyers, and judges will
find the book illuminating; fundamentally, though, it is a study of history, and as such,
deserves to be widely read by historians.
6. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America, I870-1958 (Oxford U. Press, 1992).
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Brandeis's Erie opinion as part of the general transition from a
Progressive to a liberal regulatory state. The third section suggests how the splintered Court deciding Erie was indicative of
tensions and unintended consequences influencing the course of
judicial activism throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
The fourth section raises two questions followed by a conclusion.
I

The Progressive constitution emerged from a reaction
against the constitutional order that preceded it. The period following the Civil War and Reconstruction to World War I, one of
the most economically and socially significant in U.S. history, receives very little attention from constitutional law scholars.
Even so, American social and political struggle centered on the
response to industrialization, particularly increasing social-class
conflict associated with the growth of wage labor, greater dependence on big business-what business historian Alfred
Chandler called managerial capitalism-and the gradual development of state and federal governmental institutions to match
the scale of exploitive corporate power. 7 The established view of
the turn-of-the-century constitutional order undergoing this
same transformation focuses on the Supreme Court's deployment of constitutional doctrines derived primarily from the due
process and commerce clauses to emasculate labor and government in favor of corporate capitalism. Protest movements, especially the Populists and the Progressives, fought back. But not
until the Great Depression did Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
liberalism finally institute a constitutional regime in which government became as big as business.
Purcell refines this accepted version of pro-capitalist constitutionalism, arguing that a fundamental issue underlying private
versus public ordering concerned the "primacy" of legislative or
judicial authority. Opponents of big business envisioned a constitutional order in which popular politics channeled through
democratically elected state and federal legislatures predominated; contrariwise, business interests represented by elite law-

7. See Thomas K. McCraw, Government, Big Business and the Wealth of Nations,
522-45; Jeffrey R. Fear, Constructing Big Business: The Cultural Concept of the Firm, 54674, in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Franco Amatori, Takashi Kikino, eds., Big Business and
the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge U. Press, 1997). A notable exception to constitutional
law scholars' lack of interest in the period is David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (Cambridge U. Press, 1998).
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yers asserted that unelected federal judges with appointments
based on good behavior should exercise dominant control. Purcell's reformulation suggests that due process and commerce
clause jurisprudence-which always involved exceptional cases
in which the legislature was more often than not upheld- had
less immediate impact on the daily lives of individual Americans
than the exercise of the federal court's ordinary jurisdictional
power. 8
Purcell's focus on federal court jurisdiction begins with a
doctrine the Supreme Court established in Swift v. Tyson
(1842). 9 That case raised the narrow issue of the interpretation
of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that except for matters involving federal law and the Constitution itself,
federal courts were bound by state law in all cases where it applied. The case arose from a series of speculative investments
transacted through the medium of commercial credit contracts,
which unraveled during the depression of 1839-43. The question
before the Court was what source of law to apply in relation to
section 34: did the law of New York or Maine, the residences of
the debtor and creditor, respectively, control, or did federal
judges possess a discretionary power to look beyond the state's

8. The Progressives, of course, distrusted federal courts, but recognized that the
American constitutional tradition sanctioned a legitimate exercise of judicial review, particularly as umpire of federal-state relations. Despite their criticism of the freedom of
contract doctrine associated with economic due process, for example, they recognized
that the Supreme Court often upheld diverse state regulations of private contracts. The
objective fact that the Lochner era had a low rate of invalidation has been noted by historians and lawyers for some time. See Tony Allan Freyer, Forums of Order: The Federal Courts and Business in American History 99-141 (JAI Press, 1979); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive
Era, in Yearbook 1983: Supreme Court Historical Society; Charles Warren, A Bulwark to
the State Police Power: The United States Supreme Court, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 667 (1913).
Thus the Harvard Law Review's summary of development to 1914 stated: "The law ...
seems everywhere to be that the legislature may, to some extent, at least, restrict liberty
to contract in the supposed interest of the persons restrained." Indeed, complete freedom of contract was inconsistent with the necessity in a highly organized community for
legislation to safeguard the public health, morals, safety, and general welfare. Extent of
the Legislative Power to Limit Freedom of Contract, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 374 (1914).
9. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842). Purcell actually begins his discussion not with the "original" Swift doctrine, but with the point to which it had evolved by
the closing decades of the nineteenth century (see Progressive Constitution, 51-56). In
the text I summarize the "original" Swift doctrine; below I suggest the utility of emphasizing this distinction. See Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases
in American Federalism 1-100 (New York U. Press, 1981); Tony A. Freyer, Business Law
and Economic History in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., 2 The Cambridge Economic History of the United States: The Long Nineteenth Century 456,461,465,
470,472 (Cambridge U. Press, 2000).
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local law to a body of internationally recognized commercial jurisprudence based on the practices of mercantile custom?
Although lower federal court and Supreme Court cases had
raised these issues indirectly, Swift was the first to present
squarely the construction of section 34. In a unanimous decision
written by Justice Joseph Story, the Court interpreted the section to mean that the obligation to follow local law where it "applied" implied that there existed other sources of lawparticularly international commercial custom- that federal
judges could draw upon for rules of decision to determine the
rights and obligations of commercial litigants who, because they
resided in different states or foreign nations, were qualified to
enter federal court on the basis of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the Constitution and the Judiciary Act sanctioned. At
the time, the decision was a non-controversial extension of diversity jurisdiction that Whigs such as Story, Democrats such as
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, and even the rigidly states rights
Virginia Democrat Peter V. Daniel agreed was a legitimate use
of federal judicial discretion. Thus the decision did not interfere
with state power, since it pertained only to parties who qualified
for federal diversity jurisdiction. Rather, the jurisdictional theory underlying Swift was consistent with the principle of dual
sovereignty the Taney Court was developing in response to
mounting popular discontent over American slavery and freedom.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the
federal judiciary greatly extended the discretionary authority
identified with the Swift doctrine. This expansion occurred,
however, primarily after the Civil War and its accompanying industrialization transformed the United States into a global economic player. What had been an abstract question of choice of
law suddenly assumed real significance in a radically revamped
economy. Thus, from the Civil War on, federal judges progressively enlarged the doctrine to enable corporations doing interstate business to employ federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to circumvent unfriendly state courts and juries. 10 In
addition, the Supreme Court built up around the Swift doctrine
constitutional protections of property and contract rights transcending the limits of congressional legislation. In 1875 Congress for the first time granted federal courts the full authority to
10. Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 45-122 (cited in note 9); Purcell, Litigation
and Inequality at 28-176 (cited in note 6).
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assert claims under federal law- federal question jurisdictionas well as the Constitution itself.
Disagreement among lower federal courts and a shifting
majority on the Supreme Court nonetheless persisted concerning
the relationship between the Swift doctrine, the expanded federal question jurisdiction, and their application to insurance, personal injury, and municipal bond debt litigation. In about 300
bond cases the Court applied the transformed Swift doctrine in
favor of foreign creditors.'' The insurance and personal injury
litigation presented a more complicated picture: corporate defendants initially used the threat of removing suits from state to
federal court to force smaller settlements upon plaintiffs. By the
1890s, however, plaintiffs' lawyers won decisions from the Supreme Court that were more favorable, instituting a dual market
for legal services in which defense attorneys in the pay of corporations confronted plaintiffs' lawyers relying on contingent
fees. 12 Although the picture remained ambiguous, the plaintiffs'
lawyers, overall, won more often than they lost; but because the
corporations possessed superior means to assert federal jurisdiction, critics condemned the Swift doctrine as a tool of unfair corporate manipulation. The escalating assault on what the Swift
doctrine became after the Civil War stood in marked contrast to
the Court's original, uncontroversial pre-war decision. Clearly,
the social and political context had radically changed over time
and with it the doctrine's meaning to contemporaries.
Within this transformed wider context Purcell traces the
struggles over federal jurisdiction and Progressive constitutionalism. Two issues were particularly contentious: the labor injunction and the inequitable litigation advantages that corporations
had won over the years associated with the federal judiciary's
administration of the Swift doctrine. The leading defender of
outcomes favoring nationally operating corporate business was
Justice David J. Brewer, who served on the Supreme Court from
1890 to 1910. Purcell presents Brewer as a complex figure whose
religious faith supported decisions benefiting women, AfricanAmericans, and Chinese immigrants; even so, this same religious
conviction made Brewer an effective and zealous advocate of
constitutional ideals granting extensive protections to corporate
11. See Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88: Part 1, 918-1116 (6
History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Paul A. Freund, Macmillan, 1971);
see also Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner- Diversity, Jurisdiction and the Development
of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1263 (2000).
12. Purcell, Litigation and Inequality at 148-216 (cited in note 6).
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property rights. Purcell's careful argument demonstrates that
Brewer was the Court's chief architect of establishing judicial
over legislative primacy, not only in his better known expansion
of the labor injunction in Debs and other cases, but just as importantly in broadening the reach of the Swift doctrine's federal
common law to the benefit of corporate interests. 13
Committed to overturning Brewer's constitutional edifice
was the Progressive champion, Louis D. Brandeis. He went
from decades of winning reforms as the "People's Lawyer," to a
distinguished career as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court between 1916 and 1939. As public advocate, Justice
Brandeis epitomized the Progressive vision of American constitutionalism which trusted experts use of facts to justify giving
primary lawmaking authority to the legislature's democratic
processes, particularly in order to redress economic abuses and
social injustice. Brandeis possessed a distinctive personal faith in
local control and the virtues of small-scale social, market, and
governmental units against the "curse" of bigness. Yet he was
also a brilliant and effective promoter of mainstream Progressive
reform, including ending the abuses identified with the Swift
doctrine and federal diversity jurisdiction. 14
Purcell's focus on judicial versus legislative predominance
revises the prevailing view of social conflict and judicial authority during this period. Much contemporary American historiography presents the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court as
the promoter of big business in a one-sided clash with dispossessed groups, epitomized by the union's fight against the labor
injunction. Critical legal histories of the nation's labor struggles
13. Sec In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Purcell's analysis of Justice David J.
Brewer's role in expanding Swift is incomplete, especially concerning the protracted confrontation with Justice Stephan Field over the latter's effort to limit the Swift doctrine in
accident cases by following the liberal English rule where an agent's negligence resulted
in an injury to a fellow servant. Field succeeded in holding a 5-4 majority in Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377 (1884), extending employer liability
to include injuries to fellow servants caused by the negligence of train conductors. Purcell notes that Brewer prevailed over Field in B & 0 R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893),
but neglect of the long-term split underestimates how contested was growth of the federal common law among members of the Supreme Court over the post-Civil War decades. This helps to explain why in Erie the federal trial court and the federal circuit court
of appeals would apply Baugh to uphold the damages awarded the injured party (see below). Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance at 65-74, 125-29 (cited in note 9).
14. Although Purcell cites the extensive literature about Brandeis, the distinctiveness of his values deserves greater emphasis. See Thomas K. McCraw's historical recovery of a producerism rooted in petit bourgeois values; Prophets of Regulation: Charles
Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, lames M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Belknap Press,
1984).
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have done much to revise the standard vision, including, most
recently, Ruth O'Brien's study of the tension between the
American Federation of Labor and the Progressives as they
sought to maneuver around judges to attain a "subtle reform of
labor law that fell somewhere between repudiation of the labor
injunction and immunity for organized labor" that substituted
"one form of legal restraint-the injunction-for another-the
enforceability of collective bargaining agreements." 15
Similarly, Purcell does not present the federal judiciary as a
static agent -;imply serving the interests of business. It was a
richly textured institution interacting on different levels with society and politics to order private and public action. Even so,
persistent confrontations over diversity jurisdiction and the Swift
doctrine engendered a division among Progressives, with some
arguing that winners and losers were not unequivocally clear,
since often plaintiff's lawyers turned the system to the advantage
of their clients. In addition, the constitutional limitations the judiciary imposed upon state and federal administrative agencies
constituted an uneven, often contradictory mix of lax and restrictive policies, as well as opportunities for countervailing interestgroup pressure and federal litigation. As a result, federal jurisdiction and constitutional decision making were part of a multiplicity of judicial, bureaucratic, and legislative channels by which
interest groups articulated demands. The contingency of outcomes sustained, in turn, a Progressive faith that striking a new
balance between judicial and legislative authority was not only
possible but also essential to the welfare of American society
and government.
II
The clash between opposing visions of judicial and legislative primacy in American democracy shaped the Erie decision.
During the mid-1930s Americans experienced the dramatic reversal of the Supreme Court's protracted resistance to Roosevelt's New Deal; indeed, by the time the United States entered
World War II, the Court had demolished the pro-corporate due
process and commerce clause doctrines and instituted a constitutional revolution sanctioning the liberal regulatory state. Purcell
expands upon this well-known story, analyzing Brandeis's opin-

15. Ruth O'Brien, Workers' Paradox: The Republican Origins of New Deal Labor
Policy, 1886-1935 at 42 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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ion for the Court in Erie. 16 The incisive, multidimensional exegesis of the opinion comprises about one third of the book. He
locates the suit arising from the railroad's negligence to the unemployed laborer Harry Tompkins, within the broad context of
Depression-era congressional confrontations over diversity jurisdiction and the labor injunction in which the Progressives lost
on the former issue but won the latter.
Against this background of conflict, Purcell reveals the
Court's inner process of decision-making, which resulted in overturning the ninety-six year old Swift doctrine. Brandeis's opinion for a splintered Court transformed American federalism.
After nearly a century it ended the discretionary authority federal judges had exercised to circumvent or ignore the state
courts: from 1938 on federal judges were bound by state law,
unless a federal statute or constitutional provision was at issue.
Moreover, the decision's opaque language conveyed a new constitutional obligation circumscribing federal judicial authority
within the coextensive powers of Congress. Fundamentally, Erie
replaced Brewer's constitutional principle of judicial primacy
with a regime in which judicial and legislative powers were
brought into closer alignment.
Purcell makes Brandeis and the Erie opinion central to the
ambiguous triumph of New Deal liberalism. The immediate
beneficiaries were poorer and middle-class litigants represented
by plaintiff trial lawyers, a side of the bar which, since the latenineteenth century, had steadily grown to rival in strength the
corporate defense attorneys. Reform-minded Populists and
Progressives fought to address the unfair advantages federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction gave corporate defendants operating across state lines. Purcell ties this struggle into the Progressives' better-known campaign against the laissez-faire due
process jurisprudence identified with the Supreme Court's notorious decision of Lochner v. New York (1905). By linking the
two reform objectives he demonstrates that Progressive constitutionalism represented a powerful alternative to Justice Brewer's
pro-corporate decisions.
A preoccupation with Lochner obscures, moreover, the
long-term effectiveness of the Progressive effort. In Muller v.
16. Barry Cushman's revisionist interpretation of the origins of the New Deal
Court, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (Oxford U. Press, 1998), does not discuss Erie; Purcell, however, does draw upon Cushman's
work to contextualize the decision within as well as without the Court.
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Oregon (1908), for example, Brewer wrote an opinion for a
unanimous Court upholding Brandeis's argument that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty did not prevent the
state from enacting legislation aimed at improving the working
conditions of women. More generally, elite professional legal
groups broadly associated with Progressivism pushed for and often won increased rationalization of judicial and regulatory institutions-including federal court jurisdiction-until their efforts
finally prevailed in the New Deal. Like Ellis Hawley and Alan
Brinkley, Purcell is fully aware of the limitations involved in the
transition from Progressive to liberal reform, es~ecially those regarding racial justice and wealth redistribution. 7 Erie nonetheless ended one source of corporate privilege resulting from the
operation of federal court jurisdiction, just as the Court went
from opposing to supporting New Deal liberalism as a whole.
Thus, in conjunction with the collapse of the constitutional doctrines which marked the demise of Brewer's old order, Erie-as
symbol and practice-embodied the triumph of Brandeis and the
Progressive Constitution.
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century the
practical and symbolic impact of Erie and its author changed.
Purcell's contextualization of legal doctrine illuminates the shift
from a Progressive to a liberal idea of the regulatory state, which
ultimately sanctioned corporate capitalism in the name of wartime victory and Cold War confrontation. Erie's reallocation of
personal injury, insurance, and other civil litigation to state
court-while at the same time altering the scope of interstate actions that could be litigated under federal diversity jurisdictioncoincided with America's fervent postwar embrace of a consumption-driven society. 18 Although the decision's constitutional significance was contested, Erie nonetheless also facilitated the federal judiciary's burgeoning federal question
jurisdiction, which the Warren Court expanded in order to promote civil rights and liberties and to undercut McCarthyism.
Both areas of federal jurisdiction engendered political demands to curb judicial activism. In 1958 conservative Southern
Democrats and Republicans supported a measure limiting fed17. Sec Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908). On the relationship between Progressivism and New Deal Liberalism, see Alan
Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Knopf, 1995);
Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton U. Press,
1974).
18. See Brinkley, End of Reform at 66-85 (cited in note 17).
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eral jurisdiction over cases involving individual rights; it failed to
pass the Senate by just eight votes. In the same year, by contrast, legislation intended to reduce diversity suits did become
law, but it was too weak to have a fundamentally transforming
effect. Congressional inability to resolve persistent controversy
arising from the Erie doctrine encouraged the Supreme Court to
act. As a conservative Court majority gradually eroded most of
the Warren Court precedents from the 1970s on, federal jurisdictional authority favoring individual rights was cut back.
Meanwhile, the evolving Erie doctrine occupied an important place in American legal culture. It was central to some of
the most important courses taught in the nation's law schools,
including civil procedure and federal courts, which provided
lawyers basic entry into the distinct federal and state judicial
processes. Thus, generations of lawyers associated the Erie doctrine with the fundamental institutional avenues of dispute resolution upon which client representation depended. Erie was also
basic to the stark boundary between the markets served by trial
and corporate defense lawyers. Purcell is especially good at relating doctrinal change and political conflict to legal culture and
the ideological construction of professional image. As the wider
themes unfold he tells the fascinating story of how elite law
teachers and judges-particularly Harvard law professor Henry
M. Hart, Jr. and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurterreimagined the figure and jurisprudence of Brandeis to legitimate the application of the Erie precedent to the changing social
and political realities of postwar America.
Born respectively in 1856, 1882, and 1904, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Hart represented the successive generations identified with the rise and triumph of the Progressive constitution and
its subsequent permutation into liberal constitutionalism. 19
While the two younger men achieved their own professional
prominence, both cultivated direct identification with Brandeis's
personal ethos and professional mantle. Nevertheless, Frankfurter and Hart, for different personal and principled reasons,
initially disagreed with Erie, especially its constitutional dimension. Frankfurter in particular considered the decision's abstract
19. Purcell notes that as Frankfurter and Hart grew older they were increasingly
identified as conservatives, despite an earlier commitment to liberal and radical causes.
Over the first half of the twentieth century, other prominent Progressives, including
Learned Hand and Roscoe Pound, underwent the same transformation. Brandeis, however, adhered consistently to a fully developed Progressive creed throughout his adult
life. This variation deserves further study.
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constitutional imperative a threat to his own Progressive theories, which sought to minimize federal judicial activism, cloaking
it under ideological cover of professional expertise and elitism.
Over the decades following Brandeis's death in 1941, however,
Frankfurter and Hart transformed the image of the legendary
Justice to fit their own increasingly ambivalent interpretations of
the Erie doctrine and liberal theories of federal jurisdiction.
Purcell also makes an important contribution to labor and
social history. On the level of technical procedure, which ordinarily would be primarily of interest to lawyers, he clarifies for
historians why Brandeis opposed the Declaratory Judgments
Act of 1934 and the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He
knew they could be turned to the advantage of corporate litigants and threatened basic values of local control. Many Progressives supported these measures because they furthered the
cause of institutional systemization and rationalization;
Brandeis, however, followed his own personal values and opposed them, attempting to address the dangers he perceived
through the opaque language of the Erie opinion. 20 (pp. 130-36)
A more familiar confrontation involved the labor injunction. As noted above, a growing number of critical studies by
O'Brien, Daniel Ernst, William Forbath, Victoria Hattam, Christopher Tomlins, and others have argued that from the late nineteenth century to the New Deal, organized labor's standing
within the nation's political economy was clearly contested. To a
certain extent, however, the movement also succeeded in shaping the outcome. Like other scholars, Purcell is sensitive to the
ultimately limiting character of labor's triumph in ending the labor injunction in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the subsequent institution of regulatory dispute resolution in the New
Deal's Wagner Act of 1935. Nevertheless, the resistance that labor and its allies faced from business interests and their lawyers
should not be underestimated. Purcell shows that, as Brandeis
crafted the constitutional language of the Erie opinion, he included a doctrinal hedge for the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which
20. Purcell shows that prominent Progressive lawyers, such as Benjamin Cardozo
and Charles E. Clark, desirous of achieving greater rationalization in the American legal
system, favored these measures, whereas Brandeis did not. Purcell explains that Progressives belonging to an older generation, like Brandeis, feared the political and social consequences resulting from organizational centralization, whereas their younger counterparts valued efficiency more highly. Although Purcell makes a convincing case for
Brandeis's decentralist values as being representative of the older Progressive generation, I think a similarly strong case can be made for an argument that the Justice's motivations were more distinctively personal. See note 14 and discussion below.
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was then also under review by the Supreme Court. Similarly,
Brandeis fashioned the Erie decision to eliminate the advantages
corporate defendants gained from exploiting federal diversity jurisdiction and the federal common law built up around the Swift
doctrine. Although unintended or contradictory consequences
often resulted, fundamentally, legal processes and doctrines possessed a protean legitimacy adaptable to changing social conditions and interests.
Ill

The ironic play of volition and contingency is especially evident in Purcell's analysis of Erie. Six members of the Court
voted to overturn the Swift doctrine; but despite reservations expressed by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan F. Stone
and Stanley Reed, Brandeis insisted that his opinion should establish constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction.
Over much of the century following its creation in 1842, federal
judges continuously exercised the discretion inherent in Swift to
broaden the scope of the federal common law, until it included
industrial torts, like the injury which befell the unemployed laborer, Harry Tompkins, in the Erie case. Corporations, of
course, routinely exploited the Swift doctrine in such suits; nevertheless, plaintiffs' lawyers often succeeded in turning it to the
benefit of their clients in personal injury and wrongful death
cases because the tort doctrines of the states were often in conflict and federal judges would employ their discretionary authority to apply a rule favoring the plaintiff.
The broad constitutional connections Brandeis perceived
between the Swift doctrine, Congress, the federal judiciary, and
state authority made him less concerned about the status of personal injury plaintiffs if Swift were overruled. Thus the immediate loser in Erie was Tompkins. He had won a $30,000 jury verdict because the federal trial judge had followed the Swift
doctrine and applied the more liberal negligence rule of the
American law restatement. On the basis of the new doctrine
Brandeis established in overturning Swift, however, the trial
judge was now bound to apply the Pennsylvania law where the
accident occurred, which designated individuals in Tompkins's
position as trespassers. Thus, Tompkins was denied damage
claims against the railroad.
Justice Hugo L. Black unsuccessfully attempted to preserve
Tompkins's verdict, but otherwise he vigorously supported
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Brandeis' opinion. Purcell concedes that Black's ambivalent
stance favoring both the plaintiff's recovery and Brandeis's opinion denying that result was due to the Alabamian's unswerving
commitment to maintaining the vigor of jury trials. Indeed, in
the years to come, Black was the Court's great champion of trial
lawyers. Purcell nonetheless notes only in passing that both the
federal trial and appellate court applied the discretionary judgment inherent in the Swift doctrine to decide in Tompkins's favor. Furthermore, each of the judges involved in these holdings
may be said to have been broadly associated with Progressive
values. 21
The mixed motivations shaping the Erie opinion reflected
the divergent values and interests inherent in Progressive constitutionalism's ascendancy over Brewer's faith in judicial primacy.
Brandeis approached the opinion with an absolute conviction
that Brewer's constitutional ideals could be addressed adequately only through an equally comprehensive but contrary
constitutional theory. Hughes and Stone were nonetheless apprehensive about the scope of the theory Brandeis suggested in
initial drafts of the opinion; whereupon he responded with increasingly vague language until it was acceptable to his two colleagues. The issue was difficult, however, because it touched the
diverse Progressive backgrounds of the majority deciding Erie.
The eight members of the Court participating in the opinion
were Hughes, Brandeis, Black, Reed, Stone, Owen J. Roberts,
James J. McReynolds, and Pierce Butler. In ill health which
ended in death some months after the Court handed down Erie
in 1938, the Progressive jurist Benjamin Cardozo took no part in
the decision, though he had supported the initial appeal from the
circuit court to the Supreme Court. 22 The Court's remaining adherents to Brewer's vision and New Deal opponents,
McReynolds and Butler, dissented.
Of the four Court members who joined Brandeis's Erie
opinion, Hughes, Stone, and Roberts, were prominent Progressive Republicans. Black also signed on to the opinion. During
the mid-1920s he briefly had been a member of the Ku Klux
Klan, but he had also actively supported leading Progressive
causes in his native Alabama and in the U.S. Senate before be21. The federal trial court judge was Samuel Mandelbaum; Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Thomas Swan rendered the unanimous circuit court of appeals decision.
For their association with Progressivism see Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance, at 125-29,
142-43 (cited in note 9).
22. Id. at 129-30.
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coming one of Roosevelt's most loyal New Deal liberals. Reed
voted with the majority to end the Swift doctrine, but his concurring opinion objected to Brandeis's constitutional language, arguing that a limited construction of section 34 would be sufficient to achieve the desired result without raising new
uncertainty about the scope of federal jurisdiction amid the great
transformation initiated by the Court's affirmation of the New
Deal. 23 (pp. 104, 107-09) Republican President Herbert Hoover,
who was also a forgotten Progressive, had appointed Reed, a
moderate Kentucky Democrat, as counsel for the Federal Farm
Bureau and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to fight
the Depression. After the 1932 election Reed became Roosevelt's Solicitor General; fresh from defending the New Deal before the shifting Court, Erie was the first case he participated in
as a Justice. 24
Purcell makes it clear that the divisions among the Progressive majority concerned Brandeis's reliance upon a constitutional theory to overturn Swift. Still, I think he could have done
more to distinguish Brandeis's values from those shared by the
southern Democrats Black and Reed. In the field of First
Amendment freedom of speech David M. Rabban is suggestive
regarding the distinction between the libertarian radical tradition-to which Black could be said to be sympathetic-and the
Brandeisian conviction that free speech was the precondition for
democratic citizenship. Similarly, I would suggest that in Erie,
Black's small-town southern background led him to trust in the
ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to tap the communal spontaneity of
jury trials and local court culture. Brandeis, however, viewed
trial and appellate court process more as the means to promote
individual responsibility and democratic citizenship. 25
While the motivations behind Reed's concurring opinion in
Erie are obscure, it is reasonable to speculate that at least two
factors influenced him. First, Reed shared with Black a smalltown southern background, so he, like Black, may have been
more willing to give Tompkins a fighting chance in a new jury
trial. Second, and more important, Reed perhaps perceived in
the constitutional language of Brandeis's opinion unnecessary
23. Id. at 135-36, 161-62.
24. See Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 135 (cited in note 9). On Hoover's Progressivism see Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-1933,74 Iowa
L. Rev. 1067 (1989).
25. Sec Rabban, Free Speech (cited in note 7); Tony Freyer, Hugo L. Black and the
Dilemma of American Liberalism (Addison-Wesley, 1990).
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procedural complexities that could arise in connection with the
new constitutional presumption the Court was giving the New
Deal regulatory bureaucracy after 1937. After all, as Solicitor
General he had witnessed first hand the Court's shift from opposing to supporting the New Deal. Thus, rather ironically,
Reed, not Brandeis, was the one making the Progressive argument for judicial self-restraint. 26
The tensions among the Progressive justices deciding Erie
suggested its ambiguous impact on postwar American society.
For practicing lawyers from 1938 on, the practical result of Erie's
overturning of the Swift doctrine was that federal judges now
had to apply state common law in federal diversity cases. Accordingly, a retired Little Rock attorney reminisced in 1979 that
the day the Court announced Erie was the "worst of his life," because he lost the advantage he had had representing interstate
insurance corporations in federal court. No longer could he escape local Arkansas juries by removing his client's case before
federal judges who applied corporation-friendly rules under the
Swift doctrine. 27 Purcell's earlier massive study of diversity jurisdiction from 1870 to 1958 confirms that the Arkansas lawyer's
experience was typical of corporate defense counsel prior to the
Erie decision. Purcell's new book notes that by the 1980s, however, the state law that federal judges were required to apply was
becoming increasingly more conservative as many states enacted
pro-business tort reform.
Ambivalent outcomes resulted especially from Erie's constitutional holding. Legal practitioners, law teachers, and jurists
noted repeatedly that Butler and McReynolds based their dissent primarily on the venerable rule that a court should not address an issue, especially a constitutional one, unless it has been
properly litigated by the parties. In Erie, counsel for neither side
had questioned the constitutional underpinnings of the Swift
doctrine. Thus, the dissenters argued, the decision's use of a
constitutional rationale to overturn the long standing Swift doctrine violated established tenets of judicial self-restraint that
Brandeis and other Progressives had defended for many years.
Erie was consistent with Progressive constitutional values, which
favored restraining federal judicial power within the coextensive

26. Reed followed the logic of Brandeis's classic statement of judicial self-restraint
in Ash wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
27. Tony A Freyer Interview A .F. House, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 16, 1980.
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bounds of Congress; but it was a restraint achieved through pronounced judicial activism.
Erie's constitutional ambiguity nonetheless sanctioned an
expansive federal jurisdiction facilitating post-war American society's transformation. During the second half of the twentieth
century Americans increasingly identified the federal judiciary
and the Supreme Court as the nation's primary defender of civil
rights and liberties, establishing a historic degree of racial and
gender equality under the Constitution. Purcell expertly examines the role of Harvard law professor Henry Hart and other
elite legal professionals in promoting interpretations of Erie's
constitutional language, which widened federal court jurisdiction
to match the expanding reach of the postwar liberal state.
Working through the channels of extended federal judicial and
administrative power, the civil rights movement, women's rights
advocates, and numerous public interest groups achieved significant social reforms during the postwar decades. Over the same
period, by contrast, issues involving diversity jurisdiction, which
had been so important earlier in the century, had become sufficiently routine that they were peripheral to ongoing disputes
about the federal judiciary's authority.
Purcell's chapter on Hart splendidly interweaves these
themes to suggest how Erie's Progressive constitutionalism was
transformed into the liberal constitutionalism identified with the
Warren Court. Hart had been one of Brandeis's law clerks, but
like his mentor, Frankfurter, he initially had profound misgivings
concerning the constitutional dimension the Justice had introduced into the Erie decision. By the 1950s, however, Hart had
reformulated the Erie doctrine in order to construct a brilliant
jurisprudential foundation for "neutral principles" supporting
federal judicial supremacy within American federalism. 28 (p.
229-57) Meanwhile, he blunted the intellectual force of Frankfurter's efforts to curtail the expansion of the Erie doctrine's
constitutional language. Ironically, although Hart favored the
greater social justice the Warren Court achieved through judicial
supremacy, he was an adamant foe of the doctrinal theories the
Court employed to reach its results. Hart believed that the
Court was violating the delicate balance of neutral principles he
had fashioned to both check and promote the liberal state.

28. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 2 (1959), for Hart's jurisprudential contribution to the idea of "neutral
principles."
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From the 1970s on, within American politics and professional legal culture, opposition mounted to judicial activism. In
the book's concluding chapter Purcell provides historical perspective on the relevance of Erie as a reference point for the dynamics of social and legal change in turn-of-the-century America. In the market for legal services-including what law schools
teach in order to prepare students to enter the legal professionErie perpetuated a constitutionally sanctioned jurisdiction for
state law which significantly influenced lawyers' practice and the
relation between federal and state courts. It thus maintained
and facilitated the adaptation of the American Constitution's
decentralist values during a new era of national bureaucratic and
corporate centralization and globalization. In this connection
the Progressives' opposition to federal diversity jurisdiction,
which motivated Brandeis and other reformers in response to
the evils of industrialization, has little continuing institutional or
ideological force. Despite considerable contemporary criticism
that diversity suits are organizationally inefficient, the rule of
Erie nonetheless has established a balance of interests between
plaintiff and corporate defense lawyers. Especially in interstate
personal injury and insurance claims, lawyers on both sides have
employed diversity jurisdiction as a routine source of dispute
resolution in the new age.
Meanwhile, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's conservative Court majority, its repeated rhetorical condemnation of judicial activism to the contrary notwithstanding, construed the
Erie precedent in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.(1988) to
establish a "federal common law defense to state tort claims that
allowed government contractors to avoid suits brought by individuals injured by defective products." 29 (p. 301) Much like the
Supreme Court's more familiar decisions concerning abortion
rights, the Boyle decision suggests that the Erie of the new age of
conservatism merely employs old style judicial activism to the
benefit of new litigants.
IV
Purcell's prodigious research supports a persuasively argued
thesis, which raises some interesting questions. Like Alfred
Chandler, who displaced the "good guys-bad guys" view of business history with the thesis of managerial capitalism, Purcell de29.

Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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contextualizes constitutional institutions and law, making them a
primary process of conflict resolution in American society. He
clearly presents Brandeis and his famous opinion as reflections
of the Progressive vision and the institutionalization of political,
economic and cultural struggle. At book's end Purcell concedes
that the Brandeisian Progressive vision has lost its practical force
in a new age of conservatism. He suggests, however, that
Brandeisian values, refracted through professional legal culture
and constitutional discourse, retain power to inspire America at
the millennium. While Purcell is undoubtedly correct about
Brandeis's leading influence within Progressivism, a legitimate
question arises concerning the representativeness of Brandeisian
values as distinct from his role as an effective advocate.
Brandeis's faith in small units and local control stemmed
from an absolute certainty that giant corporations threatened the
personal independence and accountability upon which participatory democratic citizenship depended. He adamantly opposed
the consumption-driven economic order, advertising, and consumerism generally, because they pandered to human weakness,
which invited political corruption and social immorality. These
convictions were so strong that Brandeis actively, though ultimately unsuccessfully, supported the legal right of smali businessmen to engage in price fixing as a way to attain the same
benefits of economies of scale that big corporations gained
through mergers and managerial centralization. 30 He also profoundly distrusted the investment methods Wall Street lawyers
pioneered to establish corporate giants. "I feel very sure that ...
[people like us) ought not to buy and sell stocks," he wrote to his
brother. "Prices of stock[s) are made. They don't grow; and
their fluctuations are not due to natural causes." 31 Most Progressives probably did not embrace these v~lues; yet Brandeis
adapted them to ongoing reform efforts, joining others within
the diverse Progressive movement to achieve goals he and they
shared.
Brandeis's ability to adjust his most deeply held convictions
to wider Progressive goals shaped the ambiguous constitutional
holding in the Erie opinion. Ever since 1938, the decision's link
between this constitutional language and the widely accepted
need to overturn the Swift doctrine has remained controversial.
Purcell's comprehensive evidence demonstrates that Brandeis
30.
31.

See McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 101-08 (cited in note 14).
Allan Gal, Brandeis of Boston 25-26 (Harvard U. Press, 1980).
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was primarily responsible for the constitutional thrust of the Erie
opinion, but more could have been done to show that within
Progressivism Brandeis possessed distinctive constitutional and
legal values. Thus during the 1912 Presidential election, Democrat Woodrow Wilson, though campaigning with Brandeisian
rhetoric against Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft, never
accepted Brandeis's absolute condemnation of constitutional
due process theories which fostered the power of giant corporations. Moreover, during the 1920s Justice Brandeis supported
trade associations because they enabled many comparatively
small firms to survive; the two Progressive Republicans Stone
and Hoover also promoted the trade association movement, but,
according to Hawley, in order to "reconcile cooperative stabilization and developmental mechanisms with antitrust objectives."32 Initially, the Supreme Court-over Brandeis's dissentopposed trade association practices, but the 1925 Maple Flooring
Association decision upheld Stone's argument that many such
practices were legal. The Court's decision not only confirmed a
broad Progressive policy objective, but also represented the accommodation of diverse motivational strands within Progressivism.33
Purcell shows that a similar process of accommodation occurred among the majority deciding Erie. The opinion's basic
logic and substance was clearly Brandeis's. Just as the Justice's
underlying motivation differed from other leading Progressives
in the trade association fight, so his distinctive social values and
jurisprudence compelled a constitutional remedy for the abuses
identified with the Swift doctrine. Hughes and Stone nonetheless
succeeded in diluting Brandeis's initially stronger constitutional
rationale, while Reed opposed it more forcefully. Given such
strong internal tensions shaping the crafting of the Erie opinion,
the resulting ambiguous constitutional language was understandable.
The ascendancy of the Progressive constitutional regime, its
influence upon the liberal Warren Court era that followed, and
the subsequent conservative backlash both reflected and sustained the course of social conflict in twentieth-century America.
Purcell's presentation of Progressive legal culture as the coun32. Hawley, 74 Iowa L. Rev. at 1102 (cited in note 24).
33. For views Hoover, Stone, and Brandeis shared on trade associations see Tony
Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880-1990 218-19
(Cambridge U. Press, 1992). Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925).
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terpoint to Brewer's pro-corporate constitutionalism demonstrates that state and federal judiciaries and the U. S. Supreme
Court were dynamic channels of social struggle in which corporate-capitalist and reform interests clashed for control. This replacement of a static image of judicial dispute resolution with a
dynamic one makes a major contribution to contemporary
American historiography. It also gives legal practitioners a
deeper awareness of the extent to which even the most technical
procedural doctrines upon which their professional autonomy
depend are imbedded in changing social, political, and cultural
contexts. Purcell's exposition of the Brandeisian Progressive
constitution confirms that the interdependence between judicial
and democratic power in America rarely produces an equitable
allocation of opportunity; but, usually, it has been wide enough
to diffuse broadbased, ongoing social disorder.
A question, nonetheless, remains regarding the origins of
the constitutional theory Brandeis wrote into Erie. The Swift
doctrine's initial meaning had been transformed by the time Justice Brewer adopted it to the goal of establishing judicial primacy. It is fair to say that Purcell neglects the degree to which
for two decades following the Civil War this steady expansion of
the Swift doctrine was vigorously contested in Congress, among
practicing lawyers and law teachers at such places as Harvard
Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and
within the federal judiciary, including an unstable majority on
the Supreme Court. The confrontation involved, moreover, not
the doctrine as originally formulated by a unanimous Court in
1842 in accordance with the principles of dual sovereignty, but
what a new Court majority had done to steadily reshape it. Beginning in Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1863), the Court erected a constitutional defense of numerous foreign creditors in the bond
cases. By the 1890s it also incorporated into the federal common
law a broadened negligence principle in railroad accident litigation.34 Even so, before the Civil War an uncontroversial Swift
doctrine embraced a narrowly conceived commercial jurisprudence; its postwar counterpart, however, facilitated the rise of
the pro-corporate due process constitutionalism associated with
Brewer and Lochner. 35

34. See note 9 and 11. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
35. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner - Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1263 (2000).
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The distinction between the original and remade Swift had a
direct bearing on the controversial constitutional rationale
Brandeis incorporated into Erie. In the Justice's private files of
the Erie opinion are his handwritten notes referring to works
published during the postwar decades by the University of Pennsylvania Law School's Judge John Innis Clark Hare and Harvard
Law School's James Bradley Thayer. These sources do not appear in the published decision's copious citations, but they
clearly influenced Brandeis's thinking as he drafted the opinion.
Hare, Thayer and others opposed the new "constitutionalized"
Swift emerging after Gelpcke, not the Taney Court's initial doctrine. Brandeis drew upon these older critical works, undoubtedly because they reinforced his own personal values regarding
the need to realign federal judicial and legislative power as a
matter of constitutional interpretation. 36 Would Brandeis's Erie
opinion have been less tendentious if it had addressed the original Swift doctrine Taney, Story, and their states' rights colleagues had found so congenial?
CONCLUSION
Generations of lawyers and judges have grappled with the
procedural and constitutional imperatives of adapting the Constitution's system of federalism to America's place in a changing
global order. The technical dimensions of the relationship between Swift and Erie have less relevance to historians than the
practical bearing the cases have had on maintaining the judiciary's and the legal profession's powerful influence in American
society.
Purcell's sweeping and original interpretation of
Brandeis and the Progressive constitution not only makes a significant contribution to the fields of law and history separately,
but combines insights from each to provide a deeper understanding of twentieth-century America. His conceptualization of federal jurisdiction as a central institution of dispute resolution in
the nation's social process establishes a new way of thinking
about the dominance of corporate capitalism and the rise and
erosion of the liberal regulatory state. The question of the original Swift doctrine's lost meaning suggests, as Tocqueville intimated, that the federal judiciary's primary role in preserving social order reached back to the nation's earliest days. Purcell's
focus on the development of this role since the end of nineteenth

36.

Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 142-53 (cited in note 9).
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century affirms the value of locating the constitutional channels
which contain social struggle within the long time stream of
American history. Approached in this light, Purcell reveals the
soul of American constitutional governance.

